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CORPORATE DEMOCRACY FROM SAY ON
PAY TO SAY ON POLITICS
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy*
INTRODUCTION
The President of the Business Roundtable once infamously
said that “[c]orporations were never designed to be
1
democracies . . .” American courts respectfully disagree and have
repeatedly held that the democratic rights of shareholders are
2
sacrosanct. The context for the Business Roundtable President’s
comment was the battle over say on pay—a battle the Business

* Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Harvard (AB), Columbia Law (JD) is a Brennan Center
Fellow and an Associate Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law. She
thanks her research assistants Courtney Chaipel, Cherylin Blitch, Meagan Salisbury and
Elizabeth Harbaugh and Stetson Law Librarian Sally Waters for their help in researching
this piece and Professors Adam Winkler, Elizabeth Pollman, Heidi Kitrosser, Kent
Greenfield, Clark Furlow and Glynn Torres-Spelliscy for their feedback and editorial
suggestions.
1. Kevin Drawbaugh, CEOs’ group hits US bill on shareholder pay votes, REUTERS,
Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.shareholderforum.com/op/Publications/20070308_Reuters.htm
(quoting John Castellani, president of the Business Roundtable). This sentiment has been
repeated by late corporate law professor Larry Ribstein. See Larry Ribstein, Shareholder
democracy vs. democracy, FORBES, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
larryribstein/2010/10/25/shareholder-democracy-vs-democracy/ (“Corporations are not
democracies.”).
2. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)) (“Shareholder objections raised through the
procedures of corporate democracy . . . .”); MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813
A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (“This Court has repeatedly stated that, if the stockholders
are not satisfied with the management or actions of their elected representatives on the
board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is available to the stockholders to
replace the incumbent directors when they stand for re-election.”); see also Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“[M]anagement has attempted
to . . . perpetuat[e] itself in office; and, to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the
legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a
proxy contest against management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary to
established principles of corporate democracy.”); Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,
651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (“This Court has been and remains assiduous in its concern
about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by
disenfranchising stockholders.”).
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Roundtable lost in the United States with the passage of the
3
financial reform legislation known as Dodd-Frank.
As I will explain in this piece, courts’ robust conception of
corporate democracy rights for shareholders should protect both
shareholders’ ability to have a say on pay and a say on politics.
Say on pay is the practice in United States, among other nations,
of mandating a non-binding shareholder vote on executive
4
compensation at publicly traded firms. A shareholders’ say on
politics does not yet exist in America. But theoretically, just as say
on pay mandates shareholder democracy in the case of executive
remuneration, say on politics would require shareholders to vote
5
on corporate political spending. Binding say on politics votes
6
already exist in the U.K.
Critiques of say on pay and say on politics have been couched
as constitutional objections based on either the Tenth or First
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. But at their heart, these
objections seem less rooted in the text of the Constitution and
more inspired by a cribbed conception of shareholders’ corporate
voting rights. To untangle who has the stronger legal argument
requires a review of how American courts have conceptualized
“corporate democracy.” I conclude that as framed by key courts
such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Delaware state courts, “corporate democracy” is
a capacious enough concept to justify both shareholders’ say on
pay and say on politics.
PART I. CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
In contrast to the argument raised by some businessmen and
academics that corporations are not democratic institutions,
American courts have held repeatedly that an important aspect of
American corporations are their procedures of corporate
democracy. The phrase “corporate democracy” appears in Justice
3. Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78n1(a)(2).
4. Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 734 (2013) (“The corporate governance provisions
in Dodd-Frank reflect a congressional decision to afford shareholders greater control over
the election process in general and give them a greater voice, especially on executive
compensation issues.”).
5. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a
Voice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2010), available at https://www.brennancenter.org
/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/shareholdersvoice2_5_10.pdf.
6. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate
Political Spending in the United Kingdom, 46 U. S.F. L. REV. 479 (2011).
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Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United— a case that empowers
corporations to spend money in American elections, but requires
7
that that spending be transparent. As Justice Kennedy wrote for
the eight-person majority of the Supreme Court:
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of
corporate democracy . . . can be more effective today because
modern technology makes disclosures rapid
and
informative. . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and
elected officials accountable for their positions and
8
supporters.

What Justice Kennedy meant by “procedures of corporate
democracy” is not entirely self-evident as he neglected to provide
a definition, but at the very least the quoted language above from
Citizens United indicates that Justice Kennedy believes that
shareholders’ holding corporate managers accountable for their
political spending is appropriate. Typically the way that
shareholders hold managers accountable is through voting their
proxy card at an annual or special meeting of shareholders.
As a matter of background, on a typical corporate proxy card
there are four items that are subject to a shareholder vote on an
annual basis: (1) the election of directors, (2) the appointment of
auditors/accountants, (3) management proposals and (4)
9
shareholder proposals. As will be explained in more detail below,
shareholders in publicly traded firms now have the right to vote
10
on a fifth category of executive compensation. And each of these
five categories are properly a subject of “corporate democracy.”
While Justice Kennedy used the term “corporate
democracy” without providing a clear definition in Citizens
United, other cases have articulated what the Supreme Court
means by the phrase “corporate democracy.” In 1964 in Borak,
the Supreme Court noted that federal securities laws are meant to
empower corporate democracy or what the Court referred to as

7. There are two aspects of the Citizens United decision. The decision is five to four
on the issue of lifting the ban on corporate expenditures in federal elections and the
decision is eight to one in favor of requiring transparency of money in politics.
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
9. Sample Proxy Card, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy_
sample.htm (last visited March 29, 2015).
10. Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78n1(a)(2).
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“fair corporate suffrage.” 11 Then in 1991, in Virginia Bankshares,
the Supreme Court quoted the legislative history of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 about the centrality of shareholders’ voting
rights: “[a]ccording to the House Report, Congress meant to
promote the ‘free exercise’ of stockholders’ voting rights, and
protect ‘[f]air corporate suffrage,’ from abuses exemplified by
proxy solicitations that concealed what the Senate Report called
the ‘real nature’ of the issues to be settled by the subsequent
12
[shareholder] votes.”
Given Delaware’s prominent role in American corporate
law, another useful source for defining the meaning of “corporate
13
democracy” is Delaware case law. Delaware is the center of
gravity for American corporate law because so many firms choose
Delaware as their locus of incorporation. As the New York Times
reported in 2012, “[n]early half of all public corporations in the
United States are incorporated in Delaware. Last year, 133,297
businesses set up here. And, at last count, Delaware had more
corporate entities, public and private, than people — 945,326 to
14
897,934.”
Admittedly, directors occupy a place of primacy in U.S.
15
corporate governance. Nonetheless, the way directors get their
authority within the corporate structure is through shareholder
elections. Akin to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Delaware courts
have been quite protective of the ability of shareholders to vote
16
for new directors. As one of the lower courts in Delaware noted,
“shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon

11. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (“The section stemmed from the
congressional belief that ‘[f]air corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach
to every equity security bought on a public exchange.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383,
at 13 (1934)).
12. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1103 (1991).
13. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (explaining
Delaware’s courts “have remained assiduous in carefully reviewing any board actions
designed to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by
shareholders, especially in an election of directors”).
14. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delawarethrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html.
15. Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (Del. 1958) (“under Delaware law the
directors manage the corporation—not the stockholders.”).
16. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”). The right to vote on
board seats is also embodied in the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) §§ 7.28
and 8.08.
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which the legitimacy of [corporate] directorial power rests.” 17 Or
as the Supreme Court of Delaware once explained:
The Courts of this State will not allow the wrongful subversion
of corporate democracy by manipulation of the corporate
machinery or by machinations under the cloak of Delaware
law. Accordingly, careful judicial scrutiny will be given a
situation in which the right to vote for the election of successor
18
directors has been effectively frustrated and denied.

A decade later, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear,
“[b]ecause of the overriding importance of voting rights, this
Court and the Court of Chancery have consistently acted to
protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with such
19
[voting] rights.”
In a 2012 case decided two years after Citizens United, the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed these earlier Delaware
precedents, stating in no uncertain terms: “[s]hareholder voting
rights are sacrosanct. The fundamental governance right
possessed by shareholders is the ability to vote for the directors
the shareholder wants to oversee the firm. Without that right, a
shareholder would more closely resemble a creditor than an
20
owner.” Other American courts agree protecting the right of
shareholders to vote for directors of their choice is a vital role
21
played by the judiciary.
17. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); id. at 663
(“The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the
shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.”).
18. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (emphasis added); see
also Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (“This Court has
been and remains assiduous in its concern about defensive actions designed to thwart the
essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising stockholders.”); Unocal Corp., 493
A.2d at 959 (disenchanted investors have “the powers of corporate democracy . . . at their
disposal to turn the board out”).
19. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del.
1994); see also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (where “stockholders
control their own destiny through informed voting . . . [t]his is the highest and best form of
corporate democracy”).
20. EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz, 50 A.3d 429, 433 (Del. 2012) (emphasis added);
see also Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“In the
interests of corporate democracy, those in charge of the election machinery of the
corporation must be held to the highest standards in providing for and conducting
corporate elections.”).
21. AHI Metnall, L.P. by AHI Kansas, Inc. v. J.C. Nichols Co., 891 F.Supp. 1352,
1360 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (“The public interest in corporate democracy, as evidenced in the
Missouri Constitution and numerous statutes, favors the issuance of an injunction.”); ER
Holdings, Inc. v. Norton Co., 735 F.Supp. 1094, 1100 (D. Mass. 1990) (“[O]ne of the most
sacred rights of any shareholder is to participate in corporate democracy.”); Int’l Banknote
Co. v. Muller, 713 F.Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y 1989) (“Courts have consistently found that
corporate management subjects shareholders to irreparable harm by denying them the
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Meanwhile, the influential D.C. Circuit Court, which reviews
many of the federal rules promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commissions (SEC), has also had the opportunity to
flesh out what it means by the concept of “corporate democracy”
in the context of SEC Rule 14a, which governs corporate proxies
22
at public firms. The D.C. Circuit’s views of corporate democracy
includes the following iterations:
It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition
that Congress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the
concept of corporate democracy. The depth of this
commitment is reflected in the strong language employed in
the legislative history:
Even those who in former days managed great corporations
were by reason of their personal contacts with their
shareholders constantly aware of their responsibilities. But as
management became divorced from ownership and came
under the control of banking groups, men forgot that they were
dealing with the savings of men and the making of profits
became an impersonal thing. When men do not know the
victims of their aggression they are not always conscious of
their wrongs . . . . Fair corporate suffrage is an important right
that should attach to every equity security bought on a public
23
exchange.

The language above appeared in a case where shareholders
24
at Dow used a shareholder resolution to try to implore the firm
to stop producing the chemical weapon napalm for the Vietnam
War. 25 As the SEC Historical Society sums up the matter, “a
shareholder of Dow Chemical sought inclusion in the company’s
right to vote their shares or unnecessarily frustrating them in their attempt to obtain
representation on the board of directors.”).
22. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Kathy Fogel & Rwan El-Khatib, Running the D.C. Circuit
Gauntlet on Cost-Benefit Analysis after Citizens United: Empirical Evidence from
Sarbanes-Oxley and the JOBS Act, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 155 (2014).
23. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5, 13 (1934)).
24. The shareholders in question were the Medical Committee for Human Rights
(MCHR), which provided emergency medical care for civil rights workers in Mississippi in
the 1960s. MEDICAL COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MED. COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 2, available at http://www.crmvet.org/docs/64_mchr.pdf (solicitation pamphlet).
25. Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1152 (1993) (“In the 1950s and 1960s, shareholders began to display
increasing concern over the corporation’s relationship to society at large. Issues such as
the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and environmentalism became important not
merely on the political agenda, but also on the corporate agenda. Shareholders began to
use the corporate proxy to debate these issues.”).

TORRES-SPELLISCY_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/26/2015 3:25 PM

. . . TO ‘SAY ON POLITICS’

437

proxy of a request to corporate directors for the company to stop
selling napalm to any buyer unless there was a reasonable
assurance that the product would not be used against any human
being. Dow refused to include the statement and the SEC
declined to take action to force the inclusion.” 26 This led to the
shareholders suing the SEC.
In the Dow case, the D.C. Circuit expounded upon the rights
of shareholders in publicly traded firms under SEC Rule 14a to
vote on political and social issues through shareholder resolutions
on corporate proxy cards. As the Court explicated:
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction
between management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply
its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and
management’s patently illegitimate claim of power to treat
modern corporations with their vast resources as personal
satrapies implementing personal political or moral
27
predilections.

This case proved to be a watershed moment for increasing
28
the scope of permissible shareholder proposals. Shortly
thereafter, the SEC changed Rule 14a-8 to allow for shareholder
29
proposals on social and political matters.
In 1992, the D.C. Circuit Court noted that shareholders also
have a right to an informed vote. As the court declared,
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as
to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is
essential that he be enlightened not only as to the financial
condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions
30
of policy, which are decided at stockholders’ meetings.

26. The Bright Image: The SEC, 1961-1973 A Greater Voice Proxy Regulation, SEC
HISTORICAL SOC’Y, available at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/tbi/voice_
b.php.
27. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see
also Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“Access to management proxy solicitations to sound out management views and to
communicate with other shareholders on matters of major import is a right informational
in character, one properly derived from section 14(a) and appropriately enforced by
private right of action.” (internal citation omitted)).
28. See e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 554, 556, 561 (D.D.C.
1985) (in light of “ethical and social significance” of a shareholder proposal on animal
cruelty, court granted preliminary injunction barring a corporation from excluding from
its proxy materials shareholder proposal regarding pate de foie gras production).
29. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,994, 52,998 (Nov. 22, 1976).
30. Roosevelt, 598 F.2d at 422 (quoting S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 12 (1934)). The Second
Circuit has come to similar conclusions on shareholder voting rights with respect to
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Thus, the conception of corporate democracy from
Delaware, the D.C. Circuit Court and the Supreme Court informs
the proper meaning that should be applied to Justice Kennedy’s
notion of “the procedures of corporate democracy” in Citizens
31
United. These courts indicate that shareholders have the right to
vote on who will represent them on the board of directors of
Delaware corporations; they have a right to vote on social and
political policies at publicly traded firms; and in either case, they
have a right to sufficient information to cast an informed vote on
32
the corporate proxy card.
PART II. SAY ON PAY
Given that American courts have embraced a broad notion
of shareholder suffrage, how will this apply to say on pay or say
on politics? Before we can answer that question, I must define
what say on pay and say on politics are. I will begin with say on
pay.
How CEOs are paid matters. As economist Dr. Susan
Holmberg explained for the Roosevelt Institute, executive
compensation packages may incentivize dangerously risky
behavior that can impact the soundness of the entire market. As
she argues, “[e]conomists are increasingly concerned that the
structure of executive compensation encourages CEOs to engage
in behavior that is economically inefficient in the long run,
unreasonably risky, or even fraudulent, which can be harmful to
33
companies, shareholders, and the economy at large.”
The issue of extraordinarily high executive compensation has
34
been in the crosshairs of corporate governance fights for years.
shareholder proposals. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 54 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The percentage of shares voted against a
proposal is insignificant because the right to cast an informed vote, in and of itself, is a
substantial interest worthy of vindication.”).
31. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
32. For arguments to the contrary of my conclusions on corporate democracy, see
Thomas Joo, Comment, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word”, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1579 (2006).
33. Susan Holmberg, Can Say-on-Pay Curb Executive Compensation? How
Shareholder Rights Limit Excessive Pay, ROOSEVELT INST. (Sept. 25, 2013), available at
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/Holmberg_Say_on_Pay_09_25_13.pdf.
34. Leo Hindery Jr., Why We Need to Limit Executive Compensation, BUS. WK, Nov.
4, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-11-04/why-we-need-tolimit-executive-compensationbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice (“[W]ith such U.S. exalted compensation, management has so elevated itself above
average employees as to have become, in my opinion, a constituency unto itself—and one
that, to compound the inequity, largely sets its own compensation.”).
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As the Sage from Omaha, Warren Buffet, once put it in 2003, “[i]n
judging whether corporate America is serious about reforming
35
itself, CEO pay remains the acid test.” Testifying before
Congress in 2009, the Chairman of the Board of H&R Block
quipped, “[w]e have all seen examples of profligate compensation
36
that can get seriously out of whack.” And, the CEO of Vanguard
John C. Bogle summed up the issue in 2005 thusly, “[t]he bottom
line is that our system of executive compensation is broken. It
37
must be fixed.” Say on pay is one approach to fix it.
Say on pay is the ability of shareholders to vote on executive
compensation packages on the corporate proxy card. Say on pay
is a policy that has been adopted by multiple nations around the
38
globe, originating in the U.K., the Netherlands and Australia
39
before it finally arrived in America. The policy comes in two
basic flavors: advisory or binding. The Netherlands and
Switzerland have binding say on pay votes that managers must
40
heed. In other countries such as Australia, Norway, Spain,

35. Jonas Bergstrand, Power pay: When the Game is Rigged in Favour of the Boss,
THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.economist.com/node/8514008
(quoting Mr. Buffett); see also Rik Kirkland, The real CEO pay problem, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE (June 30, 2006), available at http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune
/fortune_archive/2006/07/10/8380799/index.htm (“‘About half of American industry has
grossly unfair compensation systems where the top executives are paid too much,’ says
Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s partner at Berkshire Hathaway.”).
36. Further Examining What Went Wrong in the Securities Markets, How We Can
Prevent the Practices that Led to Our Financial System Problems, and How to Protect
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong
47 (2009) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden).
37. John C. Bogle, The Executive Compensation System is Broken, 30 J. CORP. L. 761,
765 (2005).
38. David F. Larker, Ten Myths of “Say on Pay,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV.
& FIN. REG (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:59 A.M.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/09/28/
ten-myths-of-say-on-pay/ (“[T]here is no single policy for implementing ‘say on pay’ that
is uniformly adopted across countries. Models of ‘say on pay’ vary considerably in terms
of whom they address (boards of directors or named executives), their objective (the
compensation philosophy or compensation levels), their restrictiveness (binding or
advisory), and their catalyst (legal mandate or market-driven pressure).”).
39. Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN
INT’L REV. 296, 296 (2010) (“Legislation giving shareholder ‘voice’ has sprung up in many
countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden.”); Paul Hodgson, A Brief History of Say on Pay, IVEY BUS. J. (2009), available at
http://blog.thecorporatelibrary.com/blog/2009/10/a-brief-history-of-say-on-pay.html (“[I]n
August 2002 the U.K. government introduced the Directors’ Remuneration Report,
regulations which included the requirement to put a remuneration report to a shareholder
vote at each annual general meeting.”).
40. Emily Chasan, Say-on-Pay Rules Expand Globally, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013,
2:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/03/05/say-on-pay-rules-expand-globally/.
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France and United States, say on pay votes are merely advisory;41
42
though the E.U. may soon have binding say on pay votes.
Say on pay votes remind corporate managers of their
fiduciary duty to shareholders and to help mitigate the classic
agency problem of managers’ prerequisite consumption identified
43
so long ago by Professors Berle and Means. With a vote on
executive compensation, shareholders can express their
displeasure (or pleasure) with how executives are being paid.
Say on pay was first suggested by shareholders in the United
States who were concerned by the skyrocketing size of executive
compensation packages which became larded with stock options,
generous retirement packages and even golden parachutes for
44
leaving the job. Finally, many shareholders viewed board
compensation committees as being captured by powerful CEOs
who could subtly, or not so subtly, influence the setting of his or
45
her own compensation rates.

41. Matt Orsagh, Will “Say on Pay” Go Global, or Has It Already?, CFA INST. (July
26, 2011), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2011/07/26/will-%E2%80%9Csayon-pay%E2%80%9D-go-global-or-has-it-already/ (“Netherlands currently requires a
binding shareholder vote on executive pay, while a non-binding vote is the model in the
U.K., Australia, Norway, Spain, France, and Sweden.”).
42. Yves Herman, EU’s Barnier urges binding shareholder vote on pay, REUTERS
May 16, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/05/16/uk-eu-pay-barnier-idUKBRE84F0
D020120516.
43. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
44. Gary Shorter, The “Pay Ratio Provision” in the Dodd-Frank Act: Legislation to
Repeal It in the 113th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp
/crs/misc/R43262.pdf (“The CEO’s pay is typically a combination of base pay, an annual
bonus tied to performance, grants of stock, stock options, contributions to a retirement
program, and various benefits such as the use of limousines and club memberships, and it
is formally set by the company’s board of directors.”).
45. Ian Gregory-Smith et al., CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the
Crisis, 124 ECON. J. F22, F22 (2014) (“Say on pay involves the direct empowerment of
shareholders in the determination of executive compensation arrangements in their
company. This move rests, explicitly or implicitly, on some version of the ‘rents capture’
hypothesis of corporate control. That is, the proposition . . . suggests that executives
‘capture’ their boards sufficiently to push their own rewards beyond purely marketdetermined levels. It is consequently assumed that self-interested shareholders will, if
offered a low-cost opportunity to voice their concerns, vote to punish excess and that
executives, fearful of such retribution, will curtail their own opportunism.”); see also Don
Baker, CEO pay is ‘acid test’ for reform, DAYTON BUS. J. (Apr. 12, 2004),
http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/stories/2004/04/12/editorial1.html?page=all
(“Boardrooms, for the most part, still are filled with good ol’ boys who pat each other on
the back and wink as they pad each other’s paychecks. It’s a you-scratch-my-back-I’llmake-you-rich understanding that has existed for too long.”); Carl T. Bogus, Excessive
Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 34
(1993) (finding in 500 large firms in 1989 that “the CEO initially recommended 90-100%
of all directorial nominees”).
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Union pension funds were some of the institutional investors
46
that raised the issue of executive compensation earliest. A say
on pay vote was first suggested in shareholder proposal by the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), investors who were self-consciously copying the
47
U.K.’s say on pay approach.
Shareholders were frequently concerned with the growing
48
disconnect between pay and performance after CEOs (and other
top managers) continued to be paid generously while leading
49
particular firms into bankruptcy or other financial ruin. As one
reporter put it during the 2008 financial crisis, “[t]he guys who ran
the recently collapsed Lehman Bros., Merrill Lynch, Bear
Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac all prove one thing. You
50
don’t always get what you pay for.” Since many suspected that
executive compensation incentivized the wrong type of short51
term risk taking that led to the 2008 financial collapse, attempts
to rein in excessive executive compensation through the adoption

46. Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 REV. FIN. STUD.
535, 576 (2011) (“Using a comprehensive sample of 1,198 shareholder proposals and 134
vote-no campaigns related to CEO pay over the 1997-2007 period, we document a
significant increase in the frequency of compensation-related activism after 2002, largely
due to greater activism by union pension funds. We find no evidence of union-related
motives in union pension funds’ activism.”); What International Markets Say on Pay: An
Investor Perspective, INST. S’HOLDER SERVS. (Apr. 2007).
47. Barbara Kiviat, Giving Investors a Say on CEO Pay, TIME, (Apr. 9, 2008),
available at http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1729480,00.html.
48. Gretchen Morgenson, Say-on-Pay Gets Support at Verizon, N.Y. TIMES May 19,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/technology/19verizon.html (quoting
Brian Foley, “People were frustrated with the way management had been paid relative to
performance . . . .”).
49. Alyce Lomax, Is Shareholder “Say on Pay” Working?, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/04/03/is-shareholder-say-on-pay-work
ing.aspx (“For years, CEO pay rose largely unchecked in America. Although leaders who
build great companies deserve pay commensurate to their accomplishments, too many
underperforming or lackluster CEOs make astronomical amounts of money at
shareholders’ expense. It’s odd that one class of workers tends to make millions -- often
without a performance review.”).
50. Eve Tahmincioglu, Can wild CEO pay be tamed? Probably not, MSNBC.COM
(Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26963309/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/
can-wild-ceo-pay-be-tamed-probably-not/#.VKYP5orF_pA (“Big paychecks for jobs not
well done: Lehman Bros.’ Richard Fuld, $40 million. Merrill Lynch’s Stanley O’Neal, $46
million. Bear Stearns’ James Cayne, $40 million. Freddie Mac’s Richard Syron, just shy of
$20 million. Fannie Mae’s Daniel Mudd, $12.2 million.”).
51. Brett Arends, Curbing Executive Pay, But Not the Perks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125624772316002303 (“Kingly pay packages for
executives hardly benefited stockholders, and encouraged managers to take short-term
risks . . . . Americans may not realize it, but ours is the only country in the world where
executives routinely expect $20 million a year in salary. And our markets have underperformed most of the rest of the world for years.”).
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of say on pay policies has increased across the globe in the wake
52
of the 2008 global financial crisis.
The inflection point for say on pay in the United States came
in the guise of the $700 billion taxpayer funded bailout of the
financial system through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(commonly known as TARP) legislation in 2008. Many TARP
bailout recipients paid large year-end bonuses. This was a bridge
too far for many members of Congress. As part of TARP, a
condition for receipt of federal bailout dollars was shareholder
votes on executive compensation packages as the result of 2009
53
supplemental legislation. Furthermore, TARP recipients were
also subject to executive compensation packages that were set by
the so-called “Pay Czar” Kenneth Feinberg, who was highly
54
and
critical of CEO perks including large bonuses
55
complementary country club memberships.
Then when the omnibus bill which would eventually become
Dodd-Frank was being crafted between 2008 and 2010, corporate
governance experts suggested that say on pay should be expanded

52. Gregory-Smith et al., supra note 45, at F22–F23 (“Since 2007–8, numerous
countries have either adopted say on pay schemes or strengthened existing ones. These
moves have been widely linked to the view that executive pay arrangements encouraged
excessive risk taking, particularly in financial services, and/or have protected senior
managers from the consequences of such behavior [sic] (Hill, 2012).”).
53. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111(e),
123 Stat. 115, 519; William Alan Nelson II, Esq., Ending the Silence: Shareholder Derivative
Suits and Amending the Dodd-Frank Act So “Say on Pay” Votes May Be Heard in the
Boardroom, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 154 (2012) (“The proposals for a ‘say on pay’
vote on executive compensation were initially set forth by the Obama Administration in
June 2009 via the Department of Treasury’s ‘White Paper’ on financial reform.”) (citing
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf ).
54. John Ydstie, Pay Czar Slams Bank Executives’ Bonuses, NPR (July 23, 2010),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128725677 (“Some of
the payments . . . many of them were over $10 million per individual, which were in our
view ill-advised,’ Feinberg said.”)
55. David Ellis & Ed Henry, Pay czar issues salary caps for execs, CNN, Dec. 11,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/11/news/companies/feinberg_compensation/ (“We
want to minimize these runaway perks and other compensation practices,’ Feinberg
said . . . .”); Devin Leonard, Bargain Rates for a C.E.O.?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/business/04comp.html (“[I]f you were the
typical American C.E.O., you may have found some of the pay czar’s prescriptions
startling. For instance, he thinks you should pay golf club dues out of your own pocket. He
also would like you to take less of your pay in cash and more of it in stock.”).
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far beyond TARP recipients to all publicly traded companies.56
57
Congress agreed and integrated the reform into Dodd-Frank.
Mohandas Gandhi is (mis)credited with declaring, “[f]irst
they ignore you. Then they laugh at you. Then they attack you.
58
Then you win.” This quote, whether Gandhi’s or not, seems to
capture a trajectory say on pay took in the past decade in the
United States.
Before it was the law of the land in America, the approach of
empowering shareholders with a say on executive pay was the
subject of considerable consternation. Say on pay was a departure
from the American corporate law that preceded it, because before
this, shareholders typically had no input on board decisions to
59
spend corporate resources.
At first the idea of a shareholder vote on executive
compensation in America was met with dismissive derision. ThenCEO of Apple, Steve Jobs joked, “I hope ‘Say on Pay’ will help
me with my $1 a year salary.” 60 The year he made this joke, Mr.
Jobs exercised over $14 million in Apple stock options and had a
private jet that was subsidized by Apple. 61
Critics tried to throw the kitchen sink at say on pay to stop it
from becoming federal law in United States. The criticisms and
objections to say on pay were all over the map and not logically
consistent when compared side by side. Objections to say on pay

56. Written Testimony Submitted by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk before the
Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives Hearing on
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk 6 (June 11, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu
/faculty/bebchuk/Policy/FSC-written-testimony-June-11-09.pdf (“[S]hareholders’ rights in
U.S. public firms are significantly weaker relative to the U.K. and other common law
countries. In addition to introducing advisory say-on-pay votes, it is important to
strengthen shareholder rights in a number of other ways.”).
57. Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78n1(a)(2).
58. Eoin O’Carroll, Political misquotes: The 10 most famous things never actually
said, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
2011/0603/Political-misquotes-The-10-most-famous-things-never-actually-said/First-theyignore-you.-Then-they-laugh-at-you.-Then-they-attack-you.-Then-you-win.-MohandasGandhi.
59. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 277 (Del. 2008)
(holding that stockholder initiated bylaws cannot mandate how the board should decide a
specific substantive question; rather they can merely define the process and procedure by
which the board makes its decisions.).
60. Ellen Lee, Apple shareholders OK ‘Say on Pay’, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2008,
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Apple-shareholders-OK-Say-on-Pay-3225225.php.
61. Steve Jobs Salary in 2007: $1, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/22807978/ns/business-us_business/t/steve-jobs-salary/#.VKykTYrF_pA.
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ranged from it being a stupid idea, 62 to an argument that
shareholders would not care about executive compensation so
63
they would not bother to vote, to shareholders are obsessed with
executive compensation therefore it would be inappropriate to
64
grant them any say on executive compensation packages, to
shareholders would not have enough information to vote
65
sensibly, or that say on pay would lead to an inflexible one-size66
fits-all approach to compensation.
67
While early say on pay bills stalled in Congress, say on pay
68
shareholder proposals caught on quickly between 2006 and 2008.
When say on pay shareholder proposals started showing up on the
62. David McCann, Say What? The Battle over Executive Comp, CFO.COM (June 4,
2008), http://ww2.cfo.com/human-capital-careers/2008/06/say-what-the-battle-over-exec
utive-comp/ (“‘Say on Pay isn’t the only thing that is really stupid that generates business
for me,’ said Alan Johnson, managing director of Johnson Associates in New York, a
consulting firm.”).
63. Leonard, supra note 55 (quoting Charles M. Elson “Unfortunately, I think sayon-pay is pointless.”); McCann, supra note 62 (quoting Alan Johnson: “To ask
shareholders for their views is going to be a burdensome side show.”); Colin Barr, Why
‘Say on Pay’ won’t work, FORTUNE, Nov. 16, 2009, available at http://www.share
holderforum.com/sop/Library/20091116_Fortune.htm (“But there’s a catch. The biggest
investors—institutions such as mutual funds and pension funds that hold more than half of
all shares—have shown little interest in playing pay watchdog. And it’s not clear that will
change even if the government mandates say on pay as part of the financial reform taking
shape in Washington.”).
64. Leonard, supra note 55 (quoting Thomas Quaadman, the executive director of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, “This [Say
on Pay] is something that isn’t about better corporate governance . . . .This is about activists
being put at the head of the line.”).
65. Kiviat, supra note 47 (“IBM says there’s no way that shareholders can know
what’s an appropriate pay practice since they’re not privy to competitive information like
which executives are receiving other job offers. Coca-Cola stresses that shareholders
already have a way to deal with pay practices they find unpalatable: don’t vote for members
of the board when they come up for re-election.”).
66. V.G. Narayanan, Executive Pay: It’s About “How,” Not “How Much,” HARV.
BUS. REV. (June 22, 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/06/its-about-how-to-pay-not-how-m/
(“Governmental and shareholder second-guessing on pay would create an environment of
fear in which no board would dare try an approach that’s different from the herd’s or that
is tailored to the company’s particular strategy. And one size definitely does not fit all
when it comes to compensation – when business strategies differ between companies, their
compensation practices ought to differ as well.”).
67. Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act of 2005, H.R. 4291,
109th Cong. (2005).
68. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIR’S, KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES TO
STRENGTHEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR U.S. PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES:
WHITE PAPERS: SERIES I 16 (2009), https://secure.nacdonline.org/source/members/white
papers-new/pdf/NACD_White_Papers.pdf (“In 2006, there were four such shareholder
proposals; only two years later, in 2008, shareholders submitted 72 proposals for say-onpay.”); Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Score One for Dissent, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/14/AR200702
1401628.html (noting 50 companies were holding “say on pay” votes on shareholder
proposals).
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proxy cards of publicly traded firms more frequently, the reaction
69
by critics became more pointedly negative. Compensation
consultants who advise boards about setting executive pay
complained in the press. Some of the objections to say on pay
displayed a deep discomfort with shareholder democracy. For
example, Frederic W. Cook, an executive compensation
consultant, argued that say on pay was “unnecessary and
potentially harmful . . . . He [wa]s also concerned that say on pay
could provide an opening to shareholders who want to muscle in
on the corporate agenda and lead to shareholder ‘plebiscites’ on
70
other issues.” Here Mr. Cook raised a classic slippery slope
argument that if say on pay were allowed, there would be no
logical stopping point to what else might end up on a corporate
proxy card for a vote.
When say on pay was being considered in Congress as
potential new federal law, certain CEOs themselves started
pushing back, arguing that requiring say on pay at all public firms
would be unnecessary and overly broad. CEOs interviewed by
USA Today before Dodd-Frank became law had a litany of
71
warnings against say on pay. William Lauder, CEO of The Estée
Lauder Cos. argued “that passing say on pay would require all
companies to pay for the sins of a few: ‘I can only say that the cost
to an organization for complying with the extraordinary rules and
69. Hodgson, supra note 39 (“Back in 2007 . . . a major shareholder campaign to
introduce an advisory vote on executive compensation was launched. The campaign,
orchestrated by a significant group of institutional stockholders, led to the launch of
shareholder resolutions at over 50 major U.S. corporations.”); Randall S. Thomas et al.,
Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate
Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1217–18 (2012) (“[I]t was not until 2006 that the
first shareholder say-on-pay proposals in U.S. public companies were submitted under
Rule 14a-8. Their popularity grew quickly and by 2009 they constituted the largest category
of shareholder-sponsored proposals, regularly garnering majority shareholder support.”
(internal citations omitted)).
70. Joseph McCafferty, The ‘Say-on-Pay’ Debate Heats Up, BUS.WK., Mar. 18, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-03-18/the-say-on-pay-debate-heatsupbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; see also Del Jones,
CEOs Openly Oppose Push for Say-on-Pay by Shareholders, U.S.A. TODAY, July 17, 2009,
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2009-07-15ceo-say-on-pay-shareholders_N.htm (“CEOs say the legislation would open the door to
micromanagement by largely uninformed shareholders, who understand neither the
competitive market forces that drive executive pay nor the complex incentives designed
by experts to get the best results . . . . ‘You cannot run companies effectively through the
democratic process of voting on all things,’ says Judy Odom, former CEO of Software
Spectrum.”).
71. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock-Salary and Options Too: The Looting of
Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 473 (2010) (“Others observe that shareholders
lack the knowledge of compensation packages to make informed decisions when voting on
say-on-pay resolutions.”); Del Jones, supra note 70.
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regulations that are largely driven from the unfortunate existence
72
of bad actors is enormous . . . .’” Thus, he worried that regulation
could be improperly tailored and expensive.
The CEO lobbying group, the Business Roundtable,
complained to Congress in 2007 when one of the earlier say on
pay bills was being debated, “[c]orporations were never designed
to be democracies. . . . While shareholders own a corporation, they
73
don’t run it . . . .” Two years later, the organization had not
changed its tune. In Congressional testimony in 2009, the
President of Business Roundtable did not accept that any
corporate governance changes were needed in reaction to the
2008 economic crash. He stated, “[a]t the outset, we must
respectfully take issue with the premise that corporate
governance was a significant cause of the current financial
crisis. . . . Some of the current corporate governance proposals,
including a universal ‘say-on-pay’ right . . . may actually
74
exacerbate the emphasis on short-term gains.”
When Dodd-Frank was in the process of being passed
through Congress, Congressman Shelby complained about the say
on pay provisions in the bill’s Conference Report. He said, “Main
Street corporations will be subject to a panoply of new corporate
governance and executive compensation requirements. These
new requirements will be costly and potentially harmful to
shareholders because they empower special interests and
75
encourage short-term thinking by managers.”
The only constitutional argument raised against say on pay
76
was that it violated federalism as state corporate law
77
traditionally governs the internal affairs of corporations. This
72. McCafferty, supra note 70.
73. Drawbaugh, supra note 1.
74. Examining the Improvement of Corporate Governance for the Protection of
Shareholders and the Enhancement of Public Confidence: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 127 (2009), (testimony of John J. Castellani, President, Business
Roundtable).
75. Conference Report (Senate), 156 Cong. Rec. S5877 (daily ed. July 15, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Shelby).
76. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, REG. (Spring 2009), http://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2009/2/v32n1-6.pdf; Joseph E.
Bachelder III, Dodd-Frank Provisions Affecting Executive Pay, HARV. L. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGS (Oct. 5, 2010) (“Dodd-Frank may be described as a significant
further step in the ‘federalization’ of executive pay. ‘Federalization’ for this purpose is
intended to mean the use of federal law as a source of rulemaking and of governance on
executive pay issues in contrast to the use of state law in deciding such issues.”).
77. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle
of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to
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critique is rooted in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution,
which states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
78
the states respectively . . . .” In other words, where a power has
not specifically been given to the Congress, the Tenth
Amendment reserves residual power to the 50 states.
Thus the argument goes, power to regulate the internal
affairs of corporations should be left with each state. As former
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman
Veasey, framed the issue:
A number of post-Sarbanes-Oxley developments in the federal
arena also raise significant federalism questions . . . . A bill
requiring a stockholder advisory vote on executive
compensation (the ‘Say on Pay’ bill) that recently passed . . .
raises the question of whether and to what extent regulation of
79
executive compensation should be federalized . . . .

As Professor Steven Bainbridge put his Tenth Amendment
argument pre-Dodd-Frank’s enactment: “Legislation that ‘fixes’
a nonexistent problem by upsetting basic principles of federalism
ought to be a nonstarter. Unfortunately, the executive
compensation debate has become so thoroughly bollixed up with
issues of class warfare and financial populism that rational
80
arguments seem to fall on deaf ears.”
Members of Congress also chimed in with their federalism
objections to legislative proposals to empower shareholders with
say on pay votes. For example in 2007, Congressman Ron Paul
stated, “[g]iving the SEC the power to require shareholder votes
on any aspect of corporate governance—even on something as
seemingly inconsequential as a nonbinding resolution—
illegitimately expands federal authority into questions of private

regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 304 (1971) (concluding that
the law of the incorporating State generally should ‘determine the right of a shareholder
to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation’)”).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. X. (1791).
79. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and
Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 49–50 (2009).
80. Bainbridge, supra note 76; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack
Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN L. REV. 1779, 1789 (2011) (“SOX and
Dodd-Frank bring to the fore the question of whether we should prefer Washington to
Dover as the principal regulator of corporate governance. If so, we should criticize those
acts for not having gone far enough in displacing state law. If not, of course, we should
criticize them for representing the latest moves in a creeping federalization of corporate
governance law.”).
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governance.” 81 Two years later in 2009, Congressman Paul was
still concerned that “[t]he Wall Street bailouts have already given
the federal government too much power in corporate
boardrooms, and H.R. 3269 [2009’s say on pay legislation] is yet
82
another step in the wrong direction.”
At the same time, Congressman Garrett worried about
federal intrusions on state law. As he said, “[h]ere [Congress]
want[s] to step in and preempt those States, States that may have
had a long history of dealing with such situations as executive pay
compensation, or States that may want to address it in the future,
83
but the underlying bill says that [Congress] will preempt that.”
Preemption, which is governed by the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, means that when a federal law and a state law
84
conflict, the federal law controls.
Despite all of these objections and predictions of doom, say
on pay became the law of the land in the United States in 2010.
Technically there are three distinct aspects of this part of the
voluminous Dodd-Frank law: (1) say on pay, (2) say on frequency
and (3) say on parachutes. The say on frequency votes allow
shareholders to vote on how frequently they want to hold say on
85
pay votes (annually, biannually or triennially). At least so far,
most shareholders have elected to hold say on pay votes on an
86
annual basis. Say on parachutes allows shareholder votes on
87
certain golden parachutes for executives.
Dodd-Frank and the final rule from the SEC implementing
say on pay were a compromise. As explained by the Ninth Circuit,
Dodd-Frank “provides that, at least every three years, public
81. H.R. Rep. 110-88, at 21 (2007) (statement of Rep. Paul).
82. 155 Cong. Rec. H9224 (daily ed. July 31, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul).
83. 155 Cong. Rec. H9231 (daily ed. July 31, 2009) (statement of Rep. Garrett).
84. U.S. Const. Art. VI cl. 2.
85. Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Investors: Evidence
from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay 23 (2013), http://www.
niri.org/Other-Content/sampledocs/Ferri-Oesch-Say-on-Pay-Paper.aspx (“Using a sample
of S&P 1500 firms, we find that management recommendation for a given frequency is
associated with 25.9% more voting support for that frequency, a figure close to estimates
of the influence of proxy advisors in prior studies.”) (unpublished study).
86. Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 1250 (“In addition, shareholders showed a clear
preference for companies holding an annual say-on-pay vote, with shareholders at 1792
companies supporting (by majority or plurality vote) annual votes, compared to a
preference of triennial voting at only 412 companies.”).
87. SEC, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute
Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act, (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm; Michael J. Segal et al, Compensation
Committee Guide, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 1, 45 (2011), available at
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/wlrkmemos/wlrk/wlrk.18330.11.pdf.
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companies must conduct a shareholder vote ‘to approve the
compensation of executives.’ 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1(a)(1). However,
these ‘say-on-pay’ votes ‘shall not be binding on the issuer or the
88
board of directors of an issuer . . . .’”
Under Dodd-Frank, shareholders are able to vote on the top
five executives’ compensation packages as a group, which makes
it impossible for shareholders to clearly object to a particular pay
89
package for a particular executive. Furthermore the vote is
precatory—that is non-binding. But say on pay does give
shareholders the ability to signal to management in a broad way
that they approve or disapprove of management’s general
approach to executive compensation.
Thus far, the federalism argument against say on pay has not
been litigated post-Dodd-Frank’s enactment. But Congress is on
90
firm Commerce Clause ground when it regulates publicly traded
companies whose stocks are bought and sold in interstate
91
commerce. And even the former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court acknowledges that while Dodd-Frank “mandates
88. Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2013).
89. Russ Banham, Fray on Pay: The Battle Over Executive Compensation and What
It Means for You, CFO MAG. (June 1, 2009), http://ww2.cfo.com/human-capitalcareers/2009/06/fray-on-pay/ (“‘It’s a blunt instrument,’ asserts Russell Miller, managing
director of Executive Compensation Advisors, a division of executive search firm
Korn/Ferry International. ‘Shareholders will be asked to vote either yes or no. It doesn’t
give them the ability to vote on the merits or detractions of various elements within
compensation programs . . . .’”).
90. Fisch, supra note 4, at 737–38 (“Any concern about congressional authority to
regulate corporations has long been put to rest. Under the increasingly liberal
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ power is understood to be very broad,
and clearly corporations (even very small ones) affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
allow broad federal oversight.”); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress:
Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 845, 914 (2013) (“the whole of federal securities laws[] regulate what is clearly
economic activity involving ‘instrumentalities of interstate commerce’ and thus
substantially relates to interstate commerce. Hence, the relevant statute indisputably falls
within the federal commerce power.”).
91. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“The statutory policy of
affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant
formulae.”); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940) (“The Torr case, with the
authorities therein cited, also disposes of the contention that in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. 78a et seq., Congress attempted to enter a field
reserved to the states, namely, the regulation of intrastate commerce.”); Oklahoma-Texas
Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1939) (“While securities are mere evidences of
obligations to pay money or of rights to participate in earnings and distribution of
corporate, trust, and other property and are mere choses in action, nevertheless in modern
commercial intercourse they are sold, purchased, delivered, and dealt with the same as
tangible commodities and other ordinary articles of commerce. . . . [W]e have no doubt
that they should be regarded as subjects of interstate commerce and transportation. . . . We
conclude that the [1933] Act is within the constitutional powers of Congress”).

TORRES-SPELLISCY_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

450

6/26/2015 3:25 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:431

a number of governance structures and practices that traditionally
have been regulated only by state law,” it “does not, however,
constitute a wholesale federal preemption of corporate law and
92
corporate governance.” Or as Yale Professor Jonathan Macey
told the Washington Post, “[s]ure, Dodd-Frank is a mess . . . sure,
the statute takes power away from citizens and states and
transfers it to the federal government. However, it’s not
93
unconstitutional. . . .” And even Professor Bainbridge admitted
after Dodd-Frank passed despite his earlier arguments: “No one
seriously doubts that Congress has the power under the
commerce clause to preempt the field of corporate governance
94
law.”
So is say on pay working? Dodd-Frank say on pay votes
started four years ago in 2011 and at the vast majority of firms,
95
executive compensation packages have been approved. Indeed,
in the first year, shareholders voted down executive compensation
96
packages only 1.6% of the time. This is not particularly
surprising as individual shareholders will hold relatively smaller
97
percentages of any given firm, and thus achieving a pro98
management majority vote is typical.

92. E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE
COUNSEL: THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REALITY 17 (2012).
93. Suzy Khimm, Could Dodd-Frank Be Unconstitutional?, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/15/could-dodd-frankbe-unconstitutional/ (quoting Jonathan Macey).
94. Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1794.
95. Abha Bhattarai, Under Say on Pay, Most Shareholders Approve Executive Pay
Packages, WASH. POST, May 13, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/capitalbusiness/under-say-on-pay-most-shareholders-approve-executive-paypackages/2013/05/12/ad8374ee-b7f7-11e2-b94c-b684dda07add_story.html.
96. Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 1248–49 (“In the 2011 Proxy season, the inaugural
year for the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate, shareholders voted on say-on-pay proposals
submitted by management at about 2,200 U.S. public companies . . . . Shareholders showed
strong support for existing pay practices, with say-on-pay votes garnering on average
91.2% support. Say-on-pay proposals were voted down only 1.6% of the time (at 37 of the
Russell 3000 companies subject to say-on-pay votes), apparently mostly based on pay-forperformance concerns.”).
97. Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for
Proxy Access 15-16 (2004), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/silversgarland
022004.pdf (finding that a union or public pension fund did not own more than 1% of the
company’s stock among eight large firms).
98. Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Management Influence on Investors: Evidence
from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay 6 (working paper 2013),
http://www.niri.org/Other-Content/sampledocs/Ferri-Oesch-Say-on-Pay-Paper.aspx
(“Combined with the evidence from studies on proxy advisors, our estimate suggests that,
on average, proxy advisors and management influence about one fourth of the total votes
each, with the remaining votes (about half of the total votes) essentially representing ‘votes
in play[.]’”).
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But notably, several high profile firms have experienced no
99
votes on say on pay. The reasons for each negative vote is rooted
in the performance of each firm as well as their shareholders’
100
disenchantment. Citigroup made headlines when it experienced
101
a negative say on pay vote in 2012. That year both major proxy
advisory services, the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and
Glass Lewis & Co., recommended a no vote on Citigroup’s
102
compensation packages. In particular, certain investors viewed
Citigroup’s CEO Vikram Pandit’s compensation as generous pay
103
for mediocre performance.
Some firms have changed their pay practices in order to avoid
104
a no vote. This happened at Disney in 2011. Shareholders and
99. Emily Chasan, RadioShack, Nabors Stick with CEO Pay Despite Shareholder
Objections, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
radioshack-nabors-stick-with-ceo-pay-despite-shareholder-objections-1409013179 (noting
negative say on pay votes at Oracle and RadioShack).
100. Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 1251 (“[A]bout half of the companies with failed
say-on-pay votes had reported negative double-digit three-year total share returns. Other
pay issues—such as tax gross-ups, discretionary bonuses, inappropriate peer
benchmarking, and unpopular pay committee members—were also mentioned. In fact, for
nearly every company where say on pay failed to get majority support, there was a
company-specific story of shareholder discontent, particularly involving the disconnect
between pay and performance at the company . . . .” (citing TED ALLEN ET AL.,
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT
(2011)).
101. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Citigroup Has Few Options After Pay Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/citigroup-hasfew-options-after-pay-vote/?_r=0 (“Citigroup received a particularly public rebuke on
Tuesday when its shareholders voted to reject the bank’s executive compensation package
at its annual shareholder meeting.”).
102. Donal Griffin & Bradley Keoun, Citigroup Investors Reject Management
Compensation Plan, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201204-17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-management-s-compensation-plan-1-.html (“ISS and
its competitor, Glass Lewis & Co., faulted [CEO] Pandit’s payouts and recommended that
investors reject the bank’s executive compensation plan for 2011.”).
103. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, Citigroup’s Chief Rebuffed on
Pay by Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES DEAL BOOK (Apr. 17, 2012), http://dealbook.ny
times.com/2012/04/17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-executive-pay-plan/?_r=0 (“‘C.E.O.’s
deserve good pay but there’s good pay and there’s obscene pay,’ said Brian Wenzinger, a
principal at Aronson Johnson Ortiz, a Philadelphia money management company that
voted against the pay package.”); John Waggoner & Matt Krantz, Shareholders Don't
Often Vote Against Huge CEO Pay, USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/story/2012-0418/shareholders-say-on-ceo-pay/54397394/1 (“Investors are saying, ‘We didn't get paid.
Why should you?’ [CEO of the Value Alliance Eleanor] Bloxham says.”).
104. Xavier Gabaix et al., CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis, 124
ECON. J. F40, F41 (2014) (“[A]fter the Enron-type scandals and the burst of the dotcom
bubble, there has been . . . an increase in compensation-related shareholder activism
through shareholder proposals and vote-no campaigns against compensation committee
members (Ertimur et al., 2011). As a result of the above activism, the mandatory adoption
of ‘say on pay’ in 2011 leads firms to change their pay practices both before and after the
vote, in an attempt to obtain a favourable voting outcome (Larcker et al., 2012; Ertimur et
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the proxy advisory service ISS objected to Disney’s practice of tax
gross ups for top managers, which are sometimes characterized as
105
a perk on a perk. This objection was communicated to Disney
before the final executive compensation package was sent out to
shareholders for the say on pay vote. Disney got the message loud
and clear and decided to remove the tax gross ups. When the
executive compensation package was sent to shareholders (sans
106
tax gross ups), they approved it.
107
The Citigroup no vote (among other no votes) and the
removal of tax gross ups at Disney are both signs that say on pay
has some real teeth and is a way for shareholders to communicate
108
with internal managers about high executive remuneration.
While mandatory say on pay votes are relatively new in the
United States, studies have shown that say on pay can impact
executive compensation when there are coordinated no-vote
109
campaigns among investors. One empirical study of say on pay
votes found that the proxy advisory firm ISS’s voting
110
recommendations were quite influential in voting outcomes.
al., 2013).”); Ira T. Kay, The Unintended Consequences of Say on Pay Votes, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG (July 8, 2013, 9:35 A.M.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2013/07/08/the-unintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes/ (“The confluence
of Say on Pay (SOP) votes and heightened scrutiny plus the influence of proxy advisory
firms (particularly ISS) are having a major unintended consequence—the movement to
‘one-size-fits-all’ or homogenization of executive compensation programs.”).
105. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Disney Withdraws Golden Parachute Provision Amid
Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/19/
business/la-fi-ct-disney-20110319.
106. Id.
107. Jim Hanks, Mike Sheehan & Daniel Mendelsohn, Disclosing Company
Responses to Negative Say-on-Pay Votes, VENABLE LLP (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/cda356b0-e569-4ba7-a34c-99163579138f/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/5845d3f5-97fb-4846-a5fb-a0e4e4cfc364/Disclosing_Comp
any_Responses_to_Negative_Say-on-Pay_Votes.pdf (listing firms that received negative
say on pay votes and the firm’s subsequent actions).
108. Diane Brady, Say on Pay: Boards Listen When Shareholders Speak, BUS. WK.,
June 7, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-07/say-on-pay-boards-listenwhen-shareholders-speak (“Almost all of the companies that faced embarrassing ‘no’
votes last year have done away with practices that irked their investors.”).
109. Ertimur et al., supra note 46, at 576 (“[W]ith respect to the consequences of
compensation-related activism, we document a $7.3 million reduction in CEO total pay
(corresponding to a 38% decrease) for firms with excess CEO pay targeted by vote-no
campaigns. As for shareholder proposals, we find evidence of a moderating effect on CEO
pay—a $2.3 million reduction—only in firms with excess CEO pay targeted by proposals
sponsored by institutional proponents and calling for a better link between pay and
performance.”).
110. James F. Cotter et. al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 1011 (2013)
(“Changes in corporate governance behavior—such as more complete disclosure of payfor-performance policies and the reversal of specific, controversial pay practices—
inaugurated by say-on-pay in 2011 appear to be continuing apace and may be even
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Another more qualitative study found no votes stemmed from
111
poor pay for performance at a given firm. Finally, a 39 country
comparison by the Federal Reserve found that say on pay reduced
112
CEO pay. The hour may be too early for either side to declare
113
victory in the United States as a matter of efficacy. But one thing
is clear, say on pay fits within the broad protection of shareholder
voting rights that Delaware and other American courts including
the U.S. Supreme Court have embraced, should Dodd-Frank’s
say on pay’s legality be challenged.
PART III. SAY ON POLITICS
Now that the United States has say on pay, could the United
States adopt say on politics in the near future? Post-Citizens
United, several academics have urged the adoption of legislation
that would provide a say on politics to protect shareholders from
114
managers’ spending corporate resources on politics. As the
gathering strength in 2012. Again led by ISS targeting of outlier companies, shareholders
have shown that their scrutiny of pay practices in 2011 was not a passing phenomenon.”);
see also Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 1249 (“Negative say-on-pay recommendations by
ISS prompted many companies to modify their disclosure filings or to change their pay
practices (sometimes retroactively) to win support.” (citing TED ALLEN ET AL.,
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT
(2011)); Larker, supra note 38 (“[T]he practice of ‘say on pay’ increases the influence of
third-party proxy advisory firms that provide recommendations to institutional investors
on how they should vote items on the annual proxy over corporate policy. Research
evidence demonstrates that these recommendations are highly influential.”).
111. Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 1252–53 (2012) (“A study of failed say-on-pay
votes prepared for the Council of Institutional Investors confirmed the importance of the
pay-performance relationship.”) (citing Robin Ferracone & Dayna Harris, Say on Pay:
Identifying Investor Concerns, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.opers.org/pensionresearchcenter/attachments/2011/WhitePaper-SayOnPay
.pdf.
112. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, CEO
Pay Slice, and Firm Value around the World, Bd. of Gov’s of the Fed. Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 1084 at 29 (July 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2013/1084/ifdp1084.pdf (“First, the level of CEO
pay is lower in the period following the adoption of SoP [Say on Pay] laws, which stems
from declines in equity-based pay. The growth in estimated CEO pay is lower for firms
subject to SoP laws compared to the control group of firms in the pre-law period and to
firms located in countries that never pass such laws. Further, the link between CEO pay
and firm performance becomes stronger after the passage of SoP laws.”).
113. Fisch, supra note 4, at 757 (“Whether say on pay will have the effect of improving
compensation policies and practices remains unclear.”).
114. Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness
in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/
forum/citizens-not-united-the-lack-of-stockholder-voluntariness-in-corporate-politicalspeech (“Citizens United could leave even stockholders who carefully screen and monitor
their investments at risk of having money they invested used for political advocacy they
oppose.”).
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current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court recently
wrote in a law review article: “By holding that for-profit
corporations have the First Amendment right to spend their funds
on political activity, Citizens United arguably exposes American
investors to the same constitutional harm found extant in Abood
115
[of compelled subsidizing of political speech]. . . .”
Professor John C. Coates IV has indicated that publiclytraded corporations’ political spending raises risks that investors
should be mindful of. As he argues: “political activity creates
distinct and difficult-to-model risks. Dozens of studies . . . support
the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests.
These harms can flow through many channels—from reputational
harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky
acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring
116
takeovers.” Thus, corporate political spending raises similar
risks of managerial shrinking and self-dealing as high executive
compensation and should be of similar concern to investors.
Professor Pamela Karlan explained, a year after Citizens
United, “[t]hat corporate managers might spend corporate funds
not to maximize the shareholders’ welfare but to maximize their
117
own is a very real danger.” Thus she indicated that corporate
politicking raises a classic agency problem for investors. Or as the
late Professor Ronald Dworkin contended, “[m]any of the
shareholders who will actually pay for the [corporate political]
ads, who in many cases are members of pension and union funds,
will hate the opinions they pay to advertise.” Consequently,
Professor Dworkin urged, “Congress should also require that any
corporation that wished to engage in electioneering obtain at least
the annual consent of its stockholders to that activity and to a
proposed budget for it, and that the required disclosure in an ad
report the percentage of stockholders who have refused that
115. Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 336 (2015).
116. John C. Coates, IV, SEC’s Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity
a Policy and Political Mistake, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Dec. 13, 2013 at 8:51 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/12/13/secs-nondecision-decision-on-corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake/; see also
Paul DeNicola et al., Handbook on Corporate Political Activity: Emerging Corporate
Governance Issues, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 17 (2010) (noting that “[c]orporate
political spending can introduce issues of reputational risk”).
117. Pamela Karlan, Me Inc., BOSTON REV. (July 1, 2011), http://www.bostonreview
.net/pamela-karlan-corporate-personhood.
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blanket consent.” 118 Professors Bebchuk and Jackson urged the
adoption of say on politics in the United States. 119 Meanwhile
Professor Benjamin Sachs has urged that shareholders be given
120
an opportunity to opt out of corporate political spending. I too
121
have urged adoption of say on politics.
In 2014, an industry group called the CFA Institute did a
survey of 1,500 financial analysts to ask them about say on politics
as well as greater transparency of corporate political spending.
The survey found that “[i]nterestingly, 62% of respondents either
agree or strongly agree that shareholders should have a say in who
122
gets [political] contributions.” Meanwhile, CEO John Bogle has
123
urged supermajority say on politics votes by shareholders.
Congressional legislation to provide shareholder approval of
corporate political spending, or what I have been calling “say on
politics,” has been introduced in Congress several sessions in a
124
row, but so far, these bills have not progressed in the legislative
125
process. Bills to provide shareholder approval of corporate
118. Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(May 13, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-threatens
-democracy/.
119. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2010).
120. Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After
Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 829 (2012).
121. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights:
Why the US Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 391 (Abol Jalilvand & A.G. Malliaris eds., 2011).
122. Political Contribution Disclosure Survey Results, CFA INST. 1, 3 (2014),
http://www.cfainstitute.org/Survey/political_contribution_survey_final.pdf.
123. John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say. Now Let Shareholders Decide,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/
15bogle.html (“Institutional investors should insist that the proxy statement of each
company in which they invest contain the following: ‘Resolved: That the corporation shall
make no political contributions without the approval of the holders of at least 75 percent
of its shares outstanding.’”).
124. Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers In The Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning
Political Spending After Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 447 (2012)
(“There are efforts to require advance consent of corporate political spending. On the
Congressional front, a pending bill called the Shareholder Protection Act (SPA), which
was introduced in 2010 and again in 2011, would require corporations to both disclose
certain direct and indirect political expenditures and obtain advance consent by a majority
of the outstanding shares before dedicating funds toward those political activities.”).
125. Bill Summary & Status—111th Congress (2009–2010)—H.R.4790, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04790:@@@R (showing the Shareholder
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, was reported out of the Committee on Financial
Services in House Report 111-620, but no floor vote was taken); Michael Megaris, The
SEC and Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Spending by Publicly Traded Companies, 22
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 432, 440 (2013) (“The stated purpose of the Shareholder
Protection Act (SPA) was to ‘amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require
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political budgets have also been introduced in several states, but
126
so far none has become law. One bill in Connecticut to empower
shareholders passed the legislature, but was vetoed by the
127
governor. Maryland, among other states, is in the process of
considering say on politics legislation as this piece is being
128
written.
129
Say on politics, like say on pay, originated in the U.K. Say
on politics under the U.K. Companies Act requires shareholders
to vote on political budgets that are proposed by managers over a
130
one to four year period. If the budget is not approved by
shareholders, then the company is not authorized to spend money
on politics, and moreover, the directors are personally liable to
131
the company for any unauthorized political spending. The U.K.
shareholder authorization before a public company may make certain political
expenditures.’ The bill, as evidenced by the timing of its introduction, was drafted in direct
response to the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. The bill, unfortunately, never
made it out of committee reviews.”).
126. See S.B. 570, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 101, 2011 Leg., 234th Sess.
(N.Y. 2011); A.B. 919, 2009 Leg. (Cal. 2009); Pa. H.B. 1002, 2011 Leg. (Pa. 2011); H.P.
1120, 2011 Leg., 125th Sess. (Me. 2011); Peter Hardin, WI Senate OKs Shareholder Consent
Bill, GAVEL GRAB (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=9793.
127. Mark Pazniokas, Common Cause Slams Malloy Veto of Campaign Finance Bill,
CT MIRROR, http://ctmirror.org/2012/06/15/common-cause-slams-malloy-veto-campaignfinance-bill/ (June 15, 2012) (discussing the governor’s veto of H.B. 5556 in 2012).
128. S.B. 153, 2015 Leg., 432nd Sess, (Md. 2015); Jamie B. Raskin, A Shareholder
Solution to ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2014, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shareholder-solution-to-citizens-united/2014/10/03/5e07c
3ee-48be-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html; see also Liz Essley Whyte, States Consider
Requiring Shareholder Approval for Political Gifts, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, (Feb. 17,
2015),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/02/17/16757/states-consider-requiring-share
holder-approval-political-gifts (“State legislators in Maine, Maryland, New York and New
Jersey have introduced bills that demand that a majority of shareholders approve
corporate gifts to political committees or candidates.”).
129. Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting As Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1335 (2013)
(“The Shareholder Protection Act would require shareholder approval of a company’s
campaign contributions and expenditures in a binding vote that basically follows the model
of say on pay.”).
130. Torres-Spelliscy supra note 121, at 391.
131. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, sched.
19 (U.K.); Explanatory Notes to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act,
2000, c. 41, ¶ 11, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes/division/2/9 (“Part IX
[of the PPERA] introduces a requirement that shareholder consent must be obtained
before a company makes a donation to a political party or incurs political expenditure. It
also requires the disclosure of political expenditure in directors’ annual reports to
shareholders.”); Companies Act § 369; see also Corporate Briefing, The Companies Act
2006: Political Donation, TRAVERS SMITH (Nov. 2007), http://www.traverssmith.com
/media/600666/companies_act_2006_-_political_donations_-_nov_2007.pdf (“[D]irectors
in default of the requirement for authorisation are jointly and severally liable to pay to the
company the amount of the unauthorised donation or expenditure, with interest, and also
to compensate the company for any loss or damage sustained by it as a result of the
unauthorised donation or expenditure having been made.”). The interest rate charged on
unauthorized political expenditures is 8% per annum. Companies (Interest Rate for
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Companies Act also provides disclosure of corporate political
132
spending to shareholders. The Shareholder Protection Act that
has been introduced in Congress mirrors the U.K. Companies Act
133
and would apply to publicly traded firms.
The International Corporate Governance Network considers
134
the U.K.’s say on politics to be a best practice. They argue:
Shareholders should be able to vote on a company’s political
donations policy, preferably through a company-proposed
resolution or, secondly, through a shareholder resolution.
Shareholders should be able to vote on the maximum amount
of company donations for political purposes. Shareholders also
should be in a position to vote on material changes to the
135
company’s donations policy.

So far, most shareholder resolutions on corporate political
spending in America have been focused on mere disclosure. As
the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF)
reported, “[i]n the 2014 season, the bulk of the 130-plus
resolutions on political spending and lobbying asked companies
to report on their lobbying expenditures, including through
indirect channels such as trade associations and non-profit
136
organizations that do not have to report their donors.”
Furthermore, some institutional investors like mutual funds are
137
notorious for sitting out votes. Though recently, mutual funds
Unauthorised Political Donation or Expenditure) Regulations, 2007, S.I. No. 2007/2242,
art. 2 (U.K.).
132. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 140 (U.K.)
(requiring disclosure of political donations in the annual director’s report); see Companies
Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report etc.) Regulations, 2005,
S.I. 2005/1011, art. 2 (substituting § 234ZZA (3)–(4) of the Companies Act of 1985 to
require disclosure of political contributions in the directors report to shareholders).
133. Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010); Shareholder
Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011); Shareholder Protection Act of
2011, S. 1360, 112th Cong. (2011).
134. ICGN Statement and Guidance on Political Lobbying and Donations, INT’L
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK (2012) https://www.icgn.org/images/ICGN/files/
icgn_main/Publications/best_practice/PLD/icgn_pld_mar2012_long.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Shareholder Resolutions, US SIF (2015), http://www.ussif.org/resolutions; see also
Heidi Welsh, Mid-Year Review: Corporate Political Activity Proposals in the 2014 Proxy
Season, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INSTITUTE 1, 10 (2014), https://si2news.files.
wordpress.com/2014/08/si2-2014-proxy-season-mid-year-review-corporate-political-act
ivity-excerpt.pdf (“A broad coalition of investors continued to file resolutions asking
companies to tell stockholders and the public more about what they spend on political
campaigns and lobbying, both directly and most particularly through intermediary groups
. . . . In all, shareholders have filed 530 resolutions on these subjects in the last five years,
with 136 in 2014.”).
137. John Helyar, Investor ‘Say on Pay’ Is a Bust, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June
16, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_26/b4234023747122.htm
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have become more engaged precisely on the issue of transparency
138
of corporate political spending.
Some post-Citizens United shareholder resolutions have
139
asked corporations to refrain from corporate political spending
140
or to give shareholders a say on politics. One such shareholder
resolution was filed by the Comptroller of New York State at AIG
141
asking for a say on politics.
Just as say on pay was hit with a barrage of criticism from
2005 to 2010 before it became federal law, so too has say on
politics been a subject of critical debate. Similar to the federalism
objection raised against the Dodd-Frank say on pay, there are also
142
federalism objections raised against say on politics proposals. In
(“Lynn Turner, a former managing director for research at Glass Lewis and former chief
accountant at the SEC, says mutual funds, which own 70 percent of U.S. equities and are
many companies’ biggest shareholders, cast few negative pay votes out of business
considerations.”).
138. Bruce F. Freed, Corporate Political Spending and the Mutual Fund Vote, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/12/09/corporate-political-spending-and-themutual-fund-vote/ (“Forty large US mutual fund families voted in favor of corporate
political spending disclosure an unprecedented 39% of the time, on average.”).
139. Lisa Baertlein & Ronald Grover, Starbucks Shareholders to Vote on Political
Spending Ban, REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/
starbucks-shareholder-idUSL1N0C7BTL20130315; Eric Lach, Chevron Shareholders Vote
Against Ban on Political Spending, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 29, 2013),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/chevron-shareholders-vote-against-ban-on-politi
cal-spending.
140. Nell Minow, Shareholders United: SEC Rules That Political-Spending Proposal
Must Go to a Vote, MONEYWATCH, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
shareholders-united-sec-rules-that-political-spending-proposal-must-go-to-a-vote/; Letter
from Ted Yu, Senior Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Finance, SEC, to Andrew A. Gerber,
Attorney for Bank of America Corp., K&L Gates LLP (Feb. 29, 2012) (on file with the
SEC), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/trilliumassetstephen02
2912-14a8.pdf (allowing shareholders at Bank of American to file a shareholder proposal
regarding the company’s political spending); Letter from Gregory S. Belliston, Special
Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin, SEC, to Stacy S. Ingram, Assistant Sec’y & Senior Counsel,
Corp. and Sec. Practice Grp., The Home Depot, Inc. (Mar. 25, 2011) (on file with the SEC),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8
.pdf (allowing shareholders at Home Depot to file a shareholder proposal regarding the
company’s political spending); Letter from Ted Yu, Senior Special Counsel, Div. of Corp.
Finance, SEC, to Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/northstarasset022312-14a8
.pdf (allowing shareholders to file a shareholder proposal at Intel about political spending).
141. Robert Steyer, DiNapoli Seeks Campaign Contribution Vote at AIG, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.pionline.com/article/20100209/ONLINE/10020
9879/dinapoli-seeks-campaign-contribution-vote-at-aig.
142. Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1019, 1053–54 (2011) (“Additional questions concern the interaction between
state and federal governance law . . . . [A] federal statute that requires a shareholder vote
but is otherwise silent may implicate state procedures for determining such issues as who
may vote, how the votes are counted, and when and how meetings are called.”).
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a Forbes article, the late Professor Ribstein listed the following
among his objections to the Shareholder Protection Act: “[its]
[s]ignificant federal regulation of formerly state-controlled
143
corporate governance issues.” Congressman Spencer Bachus
warned that the Shareholder Protection Act “is a serious
departure from the long-established premise of primacy
144
of state corporate law.”
Say on politics has inspired a similar objection to say on pay
that it would be inappropriate for the federal government to
regulate the internal affairs of corporations. This was a weak
argument against say on pay and it isn’t any more robust when
raised against say on politics. Under the Supremacy Clause,
Congress can displace conflicting state laws through preemption
145
so long as it is regulating using an enumerated power.
Here the enumerated power is still the Commerce Clause
146
Power. As the Congressional Research Service noted in its
report entitled, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC:
[T]his tradition of leaving corporate expenditure decisions to
corporate executives does not mean that Congress is without
constitutional authority to enact legislation requiring
shareholder approval of corporate political expenditures. The
Constitution’s Commerce Clause may arguably provide
Congress with authority to enact legislation of the type in
question. . . . [S]everal cases were brought challenging the
constitutionality of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The cases upheld the constitutionality
of these major federal securities laws on the basis of Congress’s
147
power under the Commerce Clause.

143. See Ribstein, supra note 1.
144. Rep. Barney Frank Holds a Markup on Pending Legislation, Day 2 House
Committee on Financial Services, SEC WIRE (July 28, 2010) (testimony of Rep. Bachus).
145. Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“The Supremacy Clause provides a
clear rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.’ Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to
preempt state law.”).
146. Testimony of Professor Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law,
Yale Law Sch., submitted to the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Rules & Administration (Feb. 2,
2010) 1, 2, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News_&_Events/gerken
testimony020210.pdf (“Congress must build a record establishing the effects of corporate
political spending on interstate commerce in order to justify entering an area traditionally,
but not exclusively, regulated by the states.”).
147. L. Paige Whitaker et al., Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC:
Constitutional and Legal Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 7 (Mar. 8, 2010), https://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R41096.pdf.
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Thus the nonpartisan research arm for Congress indicates that say
on politics is realistically within the Congress’s Commerce Clause
148
Power.
Some critics have raised the possibility that say on politics
149
could offend the First Amendment. For instance, the American
Legislative Exchange Council (better known as ALEC), has
specifically lobbied against say on politics bills in New York State
150
deploying this argument. Citizens United dispatches this First
Amendment argument, endorsing corporate accountability to
shareholders and shareholder democracy in the context of
corporate political spending. Moreover, as the Citizens United
majority held:
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making
profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in
the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.” The First
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits
citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate
151
entities in a proper way.

Lower courts have not fully addressed the issue yet, since
shareholder approval of corporate political spending has not been
adopted in any part of the United States and consequently there
has yet to be a live case or controversy to litigate. Nonetheless,
shareholder protection rationales have been raised in other cases
involving disclosure of corporate political spending and board

148. Id. (citing Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.
1940); Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F.2d 888 (10th
Cir. 1939); and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jones, 12 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y.
1935), aff’d, 79 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. granted in part, 297 U.S. 705 (1936), cert. denied
in part, 297 U.S. 705 (1936), rev’d in part on other grounds, 298 U.S. 1 (1936)).
149. Ribstein, supra note 142, at 1042 (“[T]he [Shareholder Protection] Act’s
requirement that corporations get advance shareholder approval for corporate political
activity sharply constrains all such speech by essentially requiring firms to lock in their
political activity for a year from the close of a fiscal year.”); Paul Sherman, The Latest
Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: The Shareholder Protection Act, INST. FOR JUSTICE
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://makenolaw.com/blog/56-the-latest-unconstitutional-speechrestriction-the-shareholder-protection-act/ (“And just like direct attempts to limit
corporate speech, this indirect attempt violates the First Amendment.”).
150. Mariah Blake, ALEC Attacks Shareholders, SALON, Apr. 23, 2012,
http://www.salon.com/2012/04/23/alec_attacks_shareholders/ (“ALEC’s Public Safety and
Elections Task Force . . . sent out an ‘issue alert’ to its New York members urging them to
vote the [say on politics] measure down. Among other things, the document, which was
dated Feb. 15, 2011, argued the bill imposed ‘oppressive and impractical requirements on
corporations,’ which restricted corporate free speech and thus could ‘deter and delay these
entities from participating in political debate.’”).
151. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).
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approval of corporate political spending. 152 But the language of
Citizens United, as well as language from the Delaware Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit, should help inform courts considering
these reforms to uphold them in the name of robust shareholder
suffrage rights.
CONCLUSION
Say on pay became federal law despite a barrage of criticism
from corporate lobbies, among others, that made arguments that
say on pay violated federalism under the Tenth Amendment. This
objection is being lobbed against the post-Citizens United
legislation that would provide shareholders a say on politics.
Congress would be on firm constitutional ground in regulating say
on politics at public firms by exercising its Commerce Clause
power.
The other constitutional objection to say on politics is that it
offends the First Amendment. This argument is put to rest by a
careful reading of the Citizens United decision, which envisions a
robust role for shareholders in checking the potential excesses of
corporate managers in political expenditures.
The heart of the objections to say on pay and say on politics
is not that either approach is actually unconstitutional. Rather the
gravamen of the argument against say on pay and say on politics
is that these approaches empower shareholders, which for some
corporate insiders upsets their normative view of the proper
balance of power between day to day managers and beneficial
owners. These objections exhibit a deep distrust of shareholder
democracy. Fortunately for shareholders, the most important
sources of law, the U.S. Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court,
and the Delaware Supreme Court, disagree and endorse strong
shareholder voting rights, including informed shareholder votes
on political matters within the corporate structure.

152. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 600 (8th Cir. 2013) (“any
interest in protecting [shareholders] is irrelevant as applied to IRTL, because it has no
shareholders.”); id. at 605 (“Because [Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc.] fails to show
that the board-authorization requirement treats corporations differently from other
entities, Iowa Code subsections 68A.404(2)(a) and (b) are constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause . . . .”); see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692
F.3d 864, 879 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The PAC option allows corporate political participation
without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds
with the sentiments of some shareholders . . . .” (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
163 (2003))).

